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these markets.4 The Act also mandates reforms to
mechanisms that facilitate universal telecommunications service. 5
Through the Act, Congress established a substantive and procedural framework by which potential competitors might enter the local exchange market. Substantively, Congress sought to
encourage competition by permitting Alternative
Local Exchange Carriers ("ALEC") to provide local exchange telephone service by three means.
First, Congress envisioned competition through
wholesale purchase and resale of an Incumbent
Local Exchange Carrier's ("ILEC") existing retail

I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 ("Act" or "Telecommunications Act") 1 to
promote competition and encourage development and implementation of innovative telecommunications for consumers. 2 In its deliberations,
Congress determined that regulated monopolies
had not provided American consumers with the
prices and innovative technologies that a competitive industry might achieve.3 The Act opens the
local exchange market and subsequently the long
distance market to potential telecommunications
carriers previously excluded from competing in
* Sandy Hoe is a partner with the law firm of McKenna &
Cuneo, L.L.P. in Washington, D.C. Since passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, he has been representing a
major long-distance telephone company seeking access to
local telephone markets. Mr. Hoe has more than twenty
years of experience in government contracts litigation and
regulatory counseling. Mr. Stephen Ruscus is a senior
associate with McKenna & Cuneo working with Mr. Hoe on
telecommunications regulatory and government contracts
issues. The authors wish to acknowledge Tami Lyn Azorsky, a
partner at the law firm of McKenna & Cuneo, for her

assistance in the development and review of the Fifth
Amendment analysis.
1 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
2 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124 [hereinafter House Conf Re-

port].
3
4

5

231

S. REP. No. 104-23, at 2 (1996).
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251, 252, 271 (West Supp. 1996).
Id. § 254.
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telephone services. 6 Second, Congress permitted
ALECs to purchase from ILECs unbundled network elements, 7 either singly or in combination,
in order to provide telecommunications services.8
Third, Congress permitted ALECs to erect their
own network facilities and interconnect with the
ILECs' networks "for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange
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the carrier's network."9 Procedurally, the Act directs ALECs and ILECs to negotiate interconnection agreements. 10 If the parties cannot agree on
the terms for interconnection, the Act provides
for the compulsory arbitration, by state commissions, of the open issues between the parties, including the determination of just and reasonable
rates for interconnection and unbundled network
element charges."
The Act's only guidance on the pricing of unbundled network elements is that rates for these
elements be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, and based on cost without reference to rateof-return or other rate-based proceedings. 12 In a
controversial move, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), on August 8, 1996, issued a
First Report and Order'iestablishing the methodol-

ogy by which state commissions should set prices
for unbundled network elements in the local exchange markets.14 The FCC specified that unbundled network elements should be priced at Total
Element Long-Run Incremental Costs, plus a reasonable allocation of joint and common costs
(TERIC Plus).' 5 The TELRIC Plus methodology
measures the forward-looking costs of producing
the entire quantity of each type of unbundled network element an ILEC produces, with reference
to a period of time long enough for all of the
ILEC's fixed costs to become variable or avoidable.16
ILECs claim that this methodology will result in
a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the forward-looking pricing of unbundled network elements at TELRIC Plus will
fail to compensate the ILECs for all of the historical, embedded costs1 7 of installing their communications networks. The ILECs further claim that
a "regulatory compact" between ILECs and state
commissions articulates a promise from states to
the ILECs that the ILECs will be able to recover
these costs in full." Virtually all state commissions that have issued decisions establishing prices

6 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c) (4) (A) (West Supp. 1996) (mandating that ILECs have the duty "to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier
provides at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers").
7 The Act defines "network element" as:
[F]acility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service. Such term also includes features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by
means of such facility or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, signaling systems, and information sufficient for billing and collection or used in
the transmission, routing, or other provision of a telecommunications service.
Id. § 153(29).
8 Id. § 251(c)(3) (mandating that ILECs "shall provide
such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows
requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to
provide such telecommunications service.").
9 Id. §§ 251(c) (2) (A), 251(c) (2) (B).
10 Id. § 252(a).
11 Id. §§ 252(b), 252(c), 252(d).
12 Id. § 251 (d) (1).
13 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 15499 (1996) [hereinafter FCC Order].
14 Id. paras. 618-851.
15 The FCC defines 'joint costs" as "costs incurred when
two or more outputs are produced in fixed proportion by the
same production process (i.e., when one product is pro-

duced, a second product is generated by the same production process at no additional cost.)" Id. para. 676. The FCC
defines "common costs" as "costs that are incurred in connection with the production of multiple products or services,
and remains [sic] unchanged as the relative proportion of
those products or services varies (e.g., the salaries of corporate managers)." Id.
16
See id. para. 677. In the very long run, an ILEC's fixed
costs can be adjusted to present, not past values because the
period of time will be long enough that present contracts will
have expired, and plant and equipment will need replacement. Id. para. 677 n.1682.
17
"Embedded or accounting costs are costs that firms
incurred in the past for providing a good or service and are
recorded as past operating expenses and depreciation. Due
to changes in input prices and technologies, incremental
costs may differ from embedded costs of that same increment." Id. para. 675.
18
In an attempt to overturn the FCC requirements with
respect to use of the TELRIC Plus methodology and other
pricing requirements, the ILECs filed suits, consolidated in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, requesting
and receiving a temporary stay of the pricing provisions of
the FCC Order on the grounds that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the pricing of intrastate telecommunications
services. Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 4 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1360-61
(8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996), motion to vacate stay denied, 117 S. Ct.
429 (1996). The stay, however, did not limit the freedom of
state public service commissions to weigh competing concerns and price unbundled network elements at 'just and
reasonable" TELRIC Plus rates in order to promote competition, consistent with the Act. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Util.
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for unbundled network elements, however, have
employed forward-looking pricing methodologies
in the development of these rates.' 9 These decisions assuredly will generate constitutional challenges by incumbent carriers in the future.
This Article analyzes the Act and the FCC methodology in light of the developed takings jurisprudence and evaluates the legal and factual underpinnings of the ILECs' claim that pricing of
unbundled network elements at TELRIC plus a
reasonable allocation of joint and common costs
constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking without just
compensation. Ultimately, this Article concludes
that the incumbent carriers' takings argument is
premature because it precedes implementation of
the full statutory scheme the Act establishes; that
this statutory scheme justly compensates incumbent carriers for the use of their unbundled network elements; and that, pursuant to the relevant
constitutional considerations, neither the Act nor
the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology constitutes
a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.
II.

THE PRO-COMPETITION PURPOSE AND
PRICING PROVISIONS OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
AND FCC IMPLEMENTATION
CONSTITUTE PERMITTED
GOVERNMENT REGULATORY ACTION
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diminution of property value, will not run afoul of
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against takings
without just compensation unless the scheme fails
to substantially advance a legitimate state interest.2 0 As described below, the Act sets forth a statutory scheme which Congress has determined
substantially advances legitimate state interests.
ILECs cannot and have not raised any serious
challenges to the propriety of the state interest or
the degree to which the Act advances that interest. No constitutional infirmity appears to exist
with regard to either aspect.
A.

The Act

The Act's stated purpose is "to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." 21 The legislative history
of the Act similarly states that Congress intended,
"to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory
national policy framework designed to accelerate
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition
. . . ."

In addition, the Act also preserves the

Under established constitutional jurisprudence,
a statutory scheme which justly compensates a regulated entity for any constitutionally significant

traditional goals of universal service. 23
In passing the Act, Congress faced the daunting
challenge of encouraging entry into local exchange markets in which the costs and risks of facilities-based entry appeared prohibitively high. 24

Comm'n, Arbitration Decision, MPUC P-442, 407/M-96-939,
at 3 (Nov. 12, 1996).
19 See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Arbitration Rep.
and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 25704, at 57 (Jan. 31, 1997);
Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. 96-440, at 21-22
(Dec. 23, 1996); Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, Arbitration
Decision, MPUC P-442, 407/M-96-939, at 18 (Nov. 12, 1996);
Texas Pub. Util. Comm'n, Arbitration Award, PUC Dkt. Nos.
16189, 16196, 16226, 16285, 16290, at 25 (Nov. 7, 1996).
State public service commissions have been hampered by
the lack of documentation of the cost studies produced by
incumbent carriers. To the extent that state commissions
have priced unbundled network elements in accordance with
incumbent carriers' forward-looking cost studies, these studies may or may not support pro-competition prices. Many
commissions have opted for temporary rates to satisfy statutory deadlines, while acknowledging that further provision
and evaluation of incumbent carrier cost studies and information is necessary.
20
See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245
(1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255 (1980); Munn v. Illi-

nois, 94 U.S. 113 (1976).
21
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
22
House Conf Report, supra note 2, at 113.
23
Id. § 254. Universal service is the concept that certain
basic telephone services should be made available to all
Americans at affordable prices. Id. § 254(b) (3). The Act
notes that "universal service" is "an evolving level of telecommunications services that the [FCC] shall establish periodically under this section, taking into account advances in telecommunications and information technologies and services."
Id. § 254(c) (1). The PCC Order states that it views universal
service reform as the second part of a "competition trilogy,"
which includes interconnection under Section 251 and access charge reform. FCC Order, supra note 13, paras. 6-8.
24
BellSouth's property, plant and equipment investment
in the southeast region, for example, totaled $46.9 billion
dollars at year end 1995. BELLSOUTH CORPOIATION, Notice
of 1996 Annual Meeting A-29 (1996) [hereinafter BellSouth
1996 Notice]. GTE, which provides local exchange service in
multiple area franchises nation-wide, had, at year end 1995,
property, plant and equipment investments on the order of
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In order to reduce barriers to market entry, Congress mandated that ILECs satisfy the aforementioned interconnection requirements, in addition
to selling, at wholesale, their existing services and
access to unbundled network elements.25 The Act
requires that state commissions set prices for such
interconnection and sale. 26
B.

The FCC Order

The FCC's implementation of Section 251 of
the Act, embodied in its First Report and Order, reflects the FCC's intent to comply with the underlying pro-competition goals of the Act.2 7 In adopting the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology, the
FCC recognized that "[a] dopting a pricing methodology based on forward-looking, economic
costs best replicates, to the extent possible, the
conditions of a competitive market." 28 The FCC
further stated that, as a result, the TELRIC Plus
methodology "allows the requesting carrier to
produce efficiently and to compete effectively,
which should drive retail prices to their competitive levels." 29
To establish the forward-looking incremental
costs of unbundled network elements, the FCC
first determined the network architecture that
best reflected the costs a competitive provider
would face in establishing its service.30 The FCC
determined that state commissions should identify the costs associated with a telecommunica$50.9 billion dollars. GTE 1995 ANNUAL REP. 36 (1996)
[hereinafter GTE 1995 Annual Report]. By this measure, pure
facilities-based competition with monopoly providers would
emerge, if at all, only after decades and would require that
potential market-entrants invest billions of dollars in the
hopes of one day luring enough customers away from ILECs
to produce a return on this investment.
25 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
26 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (West Supp. 1996).
27 FCC Order, supra note 13, para. 3.
28 Id. para. 679; see also id. para. 705 ("The substantial
weight of economic commentary in the record suggests that
an 'embedded cost'-based pricing methodology [vice
TELRIC Plus] would be pro-competitor - in this case the incumbent LEC - rather than pro-competition.") (citations
omitted).
29 Id. para. 679.87
30 Id. paras. 683-85.
31 Id. para. 685.
32
Id.
33 Id. In reaching its decision, the FCC rejected two
other possible bases for the TELRIC Plus calculation: calculation based on the existing network configuration, at one
extreme, and calculation based on the least-cost, most efficient network configuration and technology currently avail-
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tions network employing the most efficient existing technology given the ILECs' existing wire
center locations.31 These wire center locations
contain the critical switching systems central to
the provision of wireline telecommunications
services. According to the FCC, "[t]h[e] benchmark of forward-looking cost and existing network design most closely represents the incremental costs that incumbents actually expect to incur
in making network elements available to new entrants." 3 2 Moreover, the FCC believed that pricing unbundled network elements using this confirguration would encourage facilities-based
competition because "new entrants, by designing
more efficient network configurations, [would
be] able to provide the service at a lower cost than
the incumbent LEC," and thus would have economic incentive to continue the deployment of
innovative technologies to the benefit of consumers. 33
C.

Legitimacy of the Regulatory Scheme

The pro-competition regulatory scheme Congress has established through the Act clearly constitutes government action within the constitutional scope of Congress' power to regulate use of
private property for public purposes. As a general
matter, the Constitution permits government regulation of private property put to public use, if the
regulation promotes the public welfare.34 More
able, at the other. Id. paras. 683-85. The FCC believed that
the former configuration would not produce economically
efficient forward-looking pricing because this configuration
embodied all inefficiency and obsolescence in the ILECs existing networks. Id. para. 684. The latter configuration
would discourage facilities-based competition because it
would price existing networks as though they were the most
cost effective, leaving market entrants with no incentive to
install optimally efficient facilities. Id. para. 683.
34 See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 253
(1987) ("It is of course settled beyond dispute that regulation
of rates chargeable from the employment of private property
devoted to public uses is constitutionally permissible");
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
163 (1980); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) (land use regulation does not effect a taking if it will
"substantially advance legitimate state interests" or does not
"den [y] an owner economically viable use of his land");
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1876) ("when private
property is devoted to public use, it is subject to public regulation"); Tenoco Oil Co., Inc., v. Department of Consumer
Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013 (1st Cir. 1989) ("It is beyond dispute
that ... [government] may legitimately regulate the prices of
staples like gasoline if it thinks that the public interest requires.").
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specifically, judicial precedent confirms that Congress may regulate in order to promote competition. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 3 5 the Court,
for example, held that regulation permitting release of valuable trade secret data of companies
under Environmental Protection Agency regulatory jurisdiction was a proper exercise of governmental authority where this release would avoid
costly duplication of work, reduce significant entry barriers to the regulated market, and expedite
the availability of new end-use products to consumers.3 6 The permissible governmental purpose
in Ruckeishaus and the purpose that Congress espoused in passing the Telecommunications Act the reduction of barriers to, and encouragement
of, competition - are equivalent.37

Mere enactment of a regulatory scheme will
not, in itself, constitute a taking unless the statute
regulating property uses "does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land..

. ." 38

Moreover, the Takings Clause recognizes "the
government's power to regulate subject only to
the dictates of justice and fairness."' 3 9
In the field of utility regulation, justice and fairness exist within a "broad zone of reasonableness," 40 and the Constitution only protects utilities "from being limited to a charge for their
property serving the public which is so 'unjust' as
to be confiscatory." 41 In this regard, the
Supreme Court has specifically held that rates
35

467 U.S. 986 (1984).

Id. at 1015 ("Such a procompetitive purpose is well
within the police power of Congress.").
37
Cf Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 245-47 (no taking
exists where government, as a means to prevent anticompetitive practices by monopolistic utilities, requires a utility
under contract with cable television operators to permit use
of utility poles at lower government-set prices if these prices
provide just compensation); Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v.
ICC, 792 F.2d 287 (2nd Cir. 1985) ("[T]o foster competition
the [government] can order a [railroad] carrier to give another carrier trackage or terminal rights")).
38 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).
39 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
40 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770
(1968).
41
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307-08
(1989) (citing Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v.
Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896) ("A rate is too low if it is
'so unjust as to destroy the value of the property for all the
purposes for which it was acquired,' and in so doing 'practically deprives the owner of property without due process of
law"'); Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America, 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942) ("By long standing usage
in the field of rate regulation, the 'lowest reasonable rate' is
36
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based on the actual present value of property are
constitutional. 4 2 In fact, in the past the Supreme
Court has taken the position that the only constitutionally permissible method for valuing property was in accordance with the actual present
value of the private property put to public use, because this method best mimicked the operation of
a competitive market.4 3 Later, the Court allowed
other permissible pricing methodologies, including those based on "historical cost," that were accepted upon a determination that they, too, could
produce results within the zone of reasonableness.4
There is no impermissible constitutional taking
if the government provides just compensation for
private property put to public purpose. 45 Moreover, where the statutory framework provides the
mechanism for negotiation or arbitration of just
compensation, but not the compensation itself,
the statutory scheme nevertheless is constitutionally sound. 4 6 Finally, specific constitutional challenge to an arbitration or negotiation mechanism
on the grounds that this mechanism fails to provide just compensation will fail if an alternative
means exists whereby an aggrieved party can state
a claim against the government for recovery of
just compensation.4 7 ILECs have such an alternative means. They may seek just compensation in
the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act, if the statutory scheme
Congress established does not provide it.48 Acone which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense");
Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391-392
(1974) ("All that is protected against, in a constitutional
sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher
than a confiscatory level")).
42 Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308 (citing Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898)).
43 Id. at 308.
44 Id. at 310 (noting that in Federal Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), the Court abandoned the notion that the actual present value method was
the only constitutionally acceptable method of fixing utility
rates).
45 See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp. 480 U.S. 245, 253
(1987).
46
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013

(1984).
See id. at 1018-19.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994). Under the Tucker Act,
the United States Court of Federal Claims has "jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
47
48
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cordingly, ILECs may not challenge the state commissions' application of TELRIC Plus or other forward-looking pricing methodologies on grounds
that it violates the Fifth Amendment. Their challenges to the state commissions' actions must be
on grounds that the established rates do not comply with the Act.4 9
III.

ANY CHALLENGE TO THE JUSTNESS
OF THE COMPENSATION PROVIDED
UNDER THE ACT IS PREMATURE
PENDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
STATUTORY SCHEME

Any constitutional challenge to the justness of
the compensation provided under the Act is premature pending implementation of the overall
statutory scheme because the Act expressly provides a mechanism through which ILECs may receive just compensation. As the Court noted in
Ruckeishaus, "[t] he Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation precede the taking."50
In the instant case, the statutory framework of the
Act substantially increases the benefits afforded
the ILECs under the existing regulatory framework by providing the ILECs revenue opportunities in three specific areas, none of which were
available prior to passage of the Act. These benefits would appear to compensate ILECs fairly for
economic impacts resulting from the opening of
local exchange markets. First, Sections 251 and
252 permit ILECs to collect revenue from market
entrants for interconnection with ILEC networks
and the entrants use of unbundled network elements. 5 1 Specifically, the TELRIC Plus methodology set forth in the FCC Order ensures that these
tort." Id. § 1491 (a) (1).
49
47 U.S.C.A. § 561 (West Supp. 1996). Congress anticipated legal challenges to the FCC's implementation of the
Act and the Act itself and, therefore, enacted a procedure for
expedited review in which any constitutional challenge shall
be heard by a three-judge District Court panel. Id. § 561(a).
Appeals of the District Court decision shall be made directly
to the Supreme Court. Id. § 561 (b).
50
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1016.
51
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251, 252 (West Supp. 1996).
52
FCC Order, supra note 13, para. 690.
53
Id. para. 700.
54 Id. paras. 697-98.
55
Id. para. 679.
56
See id.
57 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1996). Section 271
prescribes the guidelines that a Regional Bell Operating
Company ("RBOC") must follow prior to offering long distance telephone service in its own local service area. Id.
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revenues will compensate ILECs for all forwardlooking economic costs of providing unbundled
network elements. 5 2 These economic costs, by
definition, include the costs of capital necessary
to attract investment.53 In addition, the FCC has
required that the prices of unbundled network elements provide a reasonable allocation of the
ILECs joint and common costs. 5 4 In competitive
markets, the price consumers will pay for goods or
services tends toward the economic costs of these
products. 55 Thus, the TELRIC Plus methodology
is intended and expected to provide ILECs with a
constitutionally sufficient approximation of the
fair market value of their property in a competitive market.56
Second, Section 271 permits the ILECs to vie
for a share of the lucrative long distance market.57
Given consumers' well-developed and long-time
brand name identification with their local exchange service providers and given the universally
recognized allure of "one-stop shopping,"5 8
ILECs may be expected to garner a significant
share of the long distance market for consumers
within their local exchange territories within a
short time of entering the market. A recent Merrill Lynch analysis clearly articulates the enormous financial impact of the ILECs' entry into the
long distance market:
GTE ... intends to gain 10% of its $4.8 billion
addressable long distance market within 12
months with negligible cost to the bottom line
....

[T]he company believes its long distance

effort will generate positive earnings impact in
1997, which reflects, in our view, the remarkably
attractive economics facing an [sic] RBOC entering an adjacent market (long distance). How often
§ 271(c). To provide long distance service in-region, the
RBOC must demonstrate that it is offering access and interconnection to its network to a competing local exchange provider pursuant to an agreement approved by the state public
service commission, or upon proving that no competing provider has requested access to the incumbent carriers network. Id. §§ 271(c) (1) (A), 271(c) (1) (B). The RBOC also
must demonstrate compliance with a competitive checklist
that ensures that the RBOC has offered access and interconnection with its network on nondiscriminatory terms required by the Act. Id. §§ 271(c) (2) (A) (ii), 271(c) (2) (B).
58
"One-stop shopping" refers to the capability of a single
telecommunications provider to offer consumers both local
and long distance service. See, e.g., Samuel F. Cullari, Comment, Divestiture II: Is the Local Loop Ripe for Competition, 3
COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 175, 181 (1995) (commenting on
Ameritech Corp.'s restructuring plan to "create twelve individual business units, each dedicated to a specific task ...
(and] all under the single Ameritech name").
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is it that an industry wakes up one day, finds its addressable market expanded by 40 % and can launch the
new service without noticeable dilution and achieve positive earnings by the second year.59
Third, Section 273 permits the RBOCs to engage in the manufacture and sale of telecommunications equipment, effective on the date of an
RBOC's entry into the long distance market pursuant to Section 271.60 RBOCs have made repeated attempts to gain entry into these markets
since divestiture in 1984.61 This suggests that the
RBOCs believe manufacture and sales of telecommunications equipment has significant revenue
potential.
In addition, Section 254 requires that every provider of interstate telecommunications services
contribute on "an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis" to federal and state universal service
support mechanisms. 62 These contributions subsidize the cost of service incurred by telecommunications carriers for the provision of service in
rural or other high cost service areas and reduce
the need for ILECs to recover monopoly rents on
other services in order to recover network costs.6 3
Finally, the existence of any economic impact
of the Act is predicated on the actions of consumers. To the extent consumers show strong brand
allegiance to the ILECs, the sale of unbundled
network elements may not come to pass. Any calculation of economic impact on the ILEC's over59 MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., UNITED
STATES TELECOM SERVICES - RBOCs & GTE 6 (May 14, 1996)
(emphasis in original).
60 47 U.S.C.A. § 273(a) (West Supp. 1996).
61
See, e.g., United States v. Western Electric, 627 F. Supp.

1090 (D.D.C 1986).
62 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(d) (West Supp. 1996).
63 As stated by Congress, consumers in rural, insular and
high cost areas should have access to "telecommunications
and information services ... that are reasonably comparable
to those services provided in urban areas" at comparable
rates. Id. § 254(b) (3). In a monopoly environment, the public policy to make available universal services to all has led to
the pricing of some services at economically inefficient (and
competitively unsustainable) high levels, under the theory
that such pricing was necessary to subsidize the provision of
universal service. FCC Order, supra note 13, para 5. To the
extent that pricing of unbundled network elements at economically efficient, pro-competition prices eliminates inefficient cross subsidization of universal service, Congress envisioned competitively neutral contributions to state and
federal universal service funds which would compensate an
ILEC (or any other carrier providing services to rural, insular
and high cost areas) for certain costs in excess of the subsidized rate. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(d) (West Supp. 1996); see also
House Conf Report, supra note 2, at 131.
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all operations requires speculation as to the magnitude of these sales. Such speculation, however,
provides no basis of support for the ILECs' takings claims.
All of the above-listed revenue streams constitute the mechanism by which ILECs may receive
revenue compensating for the imposition of regulatory restrictions on the pricing of unbundled
network elements. On balance, these revenue
benefits may in fact increase the profitability of
the ILECs. As GTE notes in its 1995 Annual Report, "[t]he gains [under the Act] will far outweigh the losses. We'll gain from strong market
growth, by entering the long-distance and homeentertainment markets, and as a wholesaler of
wireline and wireless services." 6 4 Additionally,
BellSouth notes that "[a]s a result of the 1996 Act,
BellSouth is freed from many of the laws, regulations and judicial restrictions . .. that [previously]
constrained the provision of voice, data and video
communications throughout its wireline service
territory and elsewhere."6 5 Moreover, Southern
New England Telephone, which entered the long
distance market three years ago, now has a 30%
market share in Connecticut. 66 The Act also has
permitted the Baby Bells6 7 to begin immediate
sale of long-distance service to cellular customers.6 8 Southwest Bell Communications already
has secured 43% of the long distance market
share with regard to its existing cellular customThe Act stresses the goal of universal service by requiring

the initiation ofjoint federal-state proceedings to implement
any regulatory changes pursuant to the Act. Id. § 254(a) (1).
This joint board must measure the recommendations for universal service reforms against specific principles mandated by
the Act, such as the quality and rates of service, access to advanced services, access to service in rural and high cost areas,
and specific and predictable federal and state mechanisms to

support universal service. Id. § 254(b). In addition, the Act
requires that the FCC initiate a single proceeding, within fifteen months of the enactment of the Act, to implement the
recommendations of the joint board. Id. § 254(a) (2).
64
GTE 1995 Annual Report, supra note 24, at 8.
65 BellSouth 1996 Notice, supra note 24, at A-15.
66
Andrew Kupfer, The Telecom Wars, FORTUNE, Mar. 3,
1997, at 138.
67 The 1982 divestiture of AT&T, pursuant to court order, created seven regional bell operating companies
(RBOCs). United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983). These seven companies, Pacific Telesis,
SouthWestern Bell, US West, BellSouth, Bell Atlantic,
NYNEX, and Ameritech, are commonly known as the "baby

bells."
68

1996).

See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 271(b) (3), 27 1(g) (3) (West Supp.
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ers. 69
None of the compensatory aspects of the statutory framework are fully implemented at the present time. Many state commissions have yet even
to establish permanent prices for interconnection
and unbundled network elements.70 Moreover,
these commissions have scarcely begun Section
271 proceedings to determine whether the ILECs
have satisfied the Act's conditions for entry into
the long-distance market.71 In addition, ILEC
manufacture and sale of telecommunications
equipment pursuant to the Act will not occur until the FCC has made the requisite Section 271 approvals triggering these rights. Finally, the FCC
and state commissions have not completed universal services proceedings designed to adjust subsidies for service to rural or other high cost service
areas. 72 As a threshold matter, therefore, until
the statutory scheme is fully implemented, any assessment of whether specific regulations concerning pricing of unbundled network elements effect
a taking without just compensation is premature.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE TELRIC PLUS
METHODOLOGY, IN AND OF ITSELF,
JUSTLY COMPENSATES ILECS FOR USE
OF UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENTS

As discussed above, the Telecommunications
Act establishes a statutory framework that will,
when implemented, fully compensate ILECs for
restrictions placed on the pricing of unbundled
network elements. However, while Sections 251
and 252 prohibit ILECs, in the name of competition, from charging monopoly rents for unbun-
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dled network elements, these sections also mandate that market entrants pay full value (and thus
provide just compensation) for these elements at
cost-based rates. 74 Accordingly, prices charged to
market entrants for unbundled network elements,
alone, will constitute just compensation for use of
those elements.
Arguing to the contrary, the ILECs have
stressed the need to account for the historical
costs and valuation of their property in assessing
whether application of the TELRIC Plus methodology provides just compensation for the alleged
taking.75 The Supreme Court, however, has observed that the Constitution does not require that
property be valued at original purchase price, particularly where the current market value of the
property is different from the original price:
[T]he due process clause never has been held by this
Court to require a commission to fix rates . . on the
historical valuation of a property whose history and current financial statements showed the value no longer to
The due process clause has been applied to
exist ....
prevent governmental destruction of existing economic
values. It has not and cannot be applied to insure values or to restore values that have been lost by the operation of economic forces. 76

A simple example demonstrates the rationality
of the Court's position: A homeowner purchases a
home at an original cost of $200,000. At some
subsequent time, the value of his home has fallen
to $150,000 because, in the market, the home can
be replicated, or a like home purchased, for
$150,000. The government takes his property in
order to construct a critical government facility.
If the government pays the homeowner $150,000,
it compensates him fully for the current economic

Kupfer, supra note 66, at 138.
FCC Order, supra note 13, para. 22.
As ofJanuary 1997, the FCC has received only one Section 271 application to provide in-region long distance services. Letter from Kelly R. Welsh, Executive Vice President
and General Counsel, Ameritech Michigan, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission
(Jan. 2, 1997) (on file with the CommLaw Conspectus). This is
not surprising given the uncertainty and delay in the completion of interconnection agreements, in part created by the
Eighth Circuit's stay of the FCC's pricing rules. See supra note
17. Such agreements are required, inter alia, as part of the
competitive checklist under Section 271 that RBOCs' must
meet to receive FCC approval of in-region long distance services. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c) (2) (B) (West Supp. 1996). Ameritech withdrew its application on February 11,1997 after the
FCC ruled that Ameritech had not met the competitive
checklist under Section 271. Ameritech Withdraws Petition to Offer Long Distance in Mich., COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Feb. 12,

72 The FCC's statutory deadline to promulgate final rules
for Section 254 is May 8, 1997. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(a) (2)
(West Supp. 1996). The FCC, through the recommendations
of the Federal-State Joint Board, "will establish a minimum
level of universal service and determine the way that these
services will be financed." Angela J. Campbell, Universal Service Provisions: The "Ugly Duckling" of the 1996 Act, 29 CONN. L.
REv. 187, 191 (1996). The states may not adopt inconsistent
regulations to the federal rules. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(f) (West
Supp. 1996). Thus, until the FCC has released its final rules,
the states cannot complete their universal service proceedings.
7
See supra text and accompanying notes 53-65.
74 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251, 252 (West Supp. 1996).
75 See, e.g., GTE, GTE Takings Rep. Before the Florida
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 9, 17 (1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the COMMLAw CONSPECTUS) [hereinafter GTE
Takings Report].

1997, at 1.

567 (1945).

69
70
71

76

Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548,
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value of his property. If, however, the government pays the homeowner $200,000, this amount
compensates him not only for the value of the
property, but also for losses sustained solely because of economic forces permitting replication
or purchase of the home for less money.77
The historic, embedded book values which the
ILECs seek are not reflective of current market
values. Recent arbitration proceedings throughout the country have established this fact.78 This is
because the technology currently in place is not
the technology of the future. With or without
competition, it is inevitable that the current networks will be updated and replaced with technologically advanced equipment. It is the cost of
this equipment that ultimately defines the market
value prices competitors will charge and consumers will pay in the local exchange market.79 Both
ILECs and ALECs agree that these costs will be
less than the costs ILECs have incurred to install
their existing embedded networks. 0 The mere
fact that the ILECs' property values have diminished due to market forces (e.g., advances in technology), implicates no constitutional concerns;
thus no takings claim will arise if ILECs receive
compensation equal to the current fair market
value of their networks but less than their historic
costs.
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noted above, legitimate government action justly
compensated implicates no constitutional concerns.82 The ILECs have raised no general constitutional challenges to the statutory scheme Congress has enacted. This may reflect the ILECs
recognition of the legitimacy of the government
purpose and the fact that the multiple facets of
the Act's statutory scheme do in fact provide just
compensation for any perceived taking.
The ILECs base their takings claim on their assertion that use of the TELRIC Plus methodology
will deny them recoupment through unbundled
network revenues of all historic and/or embedded costs and profit, contrary to the reasonable
expectations of their investors. 3 To ensure that a
taking does not occur, the ILECs argue that the
pricing methodology must guarantee the recovery
of all prudently incurred costs of investing in local
networks. 4 The incumbent carriers also contend
that the Takings Clause requires state public service commissions and the FCC to allow the carriers sufficient recovery of invested capital "to maintain its credit, to attract capital, and to ensure a
return that will be commensurate with investments of a similar risk."85 The incumbent carriers
point to the Supreme Court's statements in Federal
Power Commission. v. Hope Natural Gas Co.8 6 that

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution requires that "private property [not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation."8 1 As

the utility's rates must provide for capital costs as
well as operating expenses. 87 In Hope Natural Gas,
the Court stated that "the return to the equity
owner should be commensurate with returns on
investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
credit and to attract capital."8 8

77 The decision to open the local exchange market to
competition (and corresponding market forces) is separate
from the selection of the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology.
While the perceived free market value of unbundled network
elements in a competitive environment is conceptually related to the economics of forward-looking pricing, it is not
causally related to the use of the TELRIC Plus. Thus, any
diminishment in ILEC property values resulting from competition is not properly compensable as a taking without just
compensation arisingfrom use of the TELPJC Plus methodology.
The ILECs do not claim that Congressional action to permit
competition, itself, implicates the Fifth Amendment takings
clause. In fact, they cannot because the Act establishes a
scheme providing compensation for property that may be devalued. See supra text and accompanying notes 53-65.
78
See, e.g., Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No. PSC96-0811-FOF-TP, Dkt. No. 950984-TP, at 22 (June 24, 1996).
79
See FCC Order, supra note 13, para. 640.

80 See id. paras. 639-40. For example, fiber optic Digital
Loop Carrier technologies available today are more cost effective than the copper wire loops previously employed. In
addition, ILECs continue to carry the costs related to older
telephone loop architectures such as those utilized to provide multiple party lines. These architectures often contain
thousands of feet of cable that can no longer serve its intended use given the predominance of single party lines in
the telecommunication networks of today.
81
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82
See supra text accompanying note 45.
83 GTE Takings Report, supra note 75, at 32-33.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 16.
86 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
87 GTE Takings Report, supra note 75, at 15 (citing
to Hope
Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603).
88 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at
603.

V.

PRICING UNBUNDLED NETWORK
ELEMENTS AT TELRIC PLUS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A TAKING
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The TELRIC Plus methodology specifically excludes contribution to embedded costs in excess
of forward-looking costs.8 9 Unbundled network
element revenues, therefore, may not recover all
historic costs of producing these elements.90 This
is consistent, however, with takings law which permits the establishment of rates that are just, reasonable, non-confiscatory, and reflective of market values. Analysis of the incumbent carrier's
claims at varying levels demonstrates that use of
the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology does not
give rise to an unconstitutional taking, and complies with Supreme Court case law for state regulatory actions.
A.

See FCC Order, supra note 13, paras. 704-06.
Id. para. 706 ("regulation does not and should not
guarantee full recovery of [an ILECs'] embedded costs").
91 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
92 Id. at 1015. The Lucus Court held that a categorical
taking had occurred where the owner was required "to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good." Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original). See also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1182 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (finding that "this is a case in which the owner of
the relevant parcel was deprived of all economically feasible
use") (emphasis added).
93 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (noting the "essentially ad hoc, factual" na89
90

customers. These services also may be sold individually to market entrants as wholesale services
subject to resale. In addition, elements bundled
into service offerings also generate considerable
revenues through access charges levied against
long distance carriers seeking to transport and
terminate long distance calls on the ILECs networks.
Where no "categorical" taking exists, the determination of what constitutes a compensable taking requires an intensely factual inquiry, for
which, the Supreme Court has oft noted, no established formula exists:93
While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee is designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole," this Court, quite simply, has
been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when 'justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.9 4

Use of TELRIC Plus Does Not Constitute a
"Categorical" Taking

The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal CounciP identified only two categorical instances in which governmental action goes beyond regulation and effects a taking requiring just
compensation where the governmental action:
(1) results in physical appropriation; or (2) deprives the owner of "all economically beneficial or
productive use of [property]."92 Application of
the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology, developed
in accordance with the Act's admonition that
rates be 'just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory,"
does not result in a "categorical" taking under Lucas. Even considering only those revenues generated through TELRIC-based unbundled network
element prices, the ILECs, under the Act, receive
compensation for the market value of their property. Indeed, the ILECs' network elements have
multiple economic uses. Not only may ILECs
make money on the sale of these elements to market entrants, but the ILEC itself uses these network elements to provide a myriad of telecommunications service packages to existing ILEC retail
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This lack of rigid criteria has led the Supreme
Court to focus on two primary factors in determining the existence of a taking requiring just
compensation: (1) the economic impact of the
regulatory scheme; and (2) the extent to which
the scheme impairs distinct investment-backed expectations. 95
B.

Any Negative Economic Impact Is Not
Sufficient to Constitute a Taking

"[I]n a wide variety of contexts th[e] government may execute laws or programs that adversely
affect recognized economic values" without its action constituting a taking.96 Under the Lucas
calculus, however, the Court will consider evidence of economic impact in considering
whether government regulatory action constitutes
ture of the takings analysis).
94 Id. at 123-24.
95
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 124); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1005 (1984); see also Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124 (treating, as
a third factor, the character of the governmental action as
physical invasion or mere regulatory adjustment of the "benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good").
96
Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124 (recognizing that the government's exercise of its power to tax for the general welfare
is an "obvious" example of a noncompensable economic impact).
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a taking requiring just compensation.97 Compensation may be necessary where the regulatory
scheme effects a "partial taking" resulting in the
loss of some, but not all, the property's value.98
While a claimant alleging economic impact may
not receive compensation for a mere diminution
in the economic use of property,99 loss of somewhat greater value may constitute a partial taking. 00
Significantly, it is the overall impact of a regulatory scheme and not merely the impact of a particular requirement therein that determines the
extent to which economic impact is present.10 1 In
Colorado Springs, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia considered the claim,
brought by an agricultural Production Credit Association against the Farm Credit Administration,
that forced contribution of funds to less healthy
agricultural financial institutions under the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 constituted a taking
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. 102 In determining that no taking without just compensation
had occurred, the District Court considered the
"'significant number of provisions in the Act that
moderate and mitigate the economic impact' of
the statute at issue."1 03 In attempting to demonstrate economic impact, a claimant bears the
heavy burden of demonstrating that the regulatory decision, in its entirety, is both unjust and unreasonable. 0 4
Reliance on lack of profitability in one portion
of a business establishes no taking. As the
Supreme Court in Hope Natural Gas observed, "[i] t

is not theory but the impact of the rate order
which counts. If the total effect of the rate order
cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial in-

97 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
98 Loveladies Harbor,28 F.3d at 1180; Florida Rock Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
99 The term "mere diminution" refers to a decreases in
property value "resulting from shared economic impacts[,] ... in which the property owner has in a sense been
compensated by the public program 'adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good."' Loveladies Harbor,28 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
100 Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568 (noting that the inquiry
for a "partial taking" is whether "there was some (but not a
total) reduction in the overall market value of plaintiffs
property as a result of the regulatory imposition") (emphasis
in original).
101 See, e.g., Colorado Springs Production Credit Assoc. v.
Farm Credit Admin., 758 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1991); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989) (quoting Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 602 (1944)).
102
Colorado Springs, 758 F. Supp. at 6.
103
Id. at 13 (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)).

104 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254,
1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
105 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added).

quiry .

..

is at an end."105 Thus, in considering

the effect of the government action, the effect of
the entire regulatory scheme must be taken into
account - the prices for unbundled network elements, the revenue from resale, the revenue from
long distance, and any other compensation the
ILEC receives as owner of the unbundled network
elements.
The ILECs rely on the Supreme Court's statements in Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission
of Louisana 0 6 for the proposition that a statutory
scheme effects a taking if it causes a regulated entity to lose money in any facet of its business operations.' 07 Brooks-Scanlon, however, simply stands
for the proposition that a regulated entity must be
permitted to go out of business rather than operate, in its entirety, at a loss. 08 If it remains in
business, the regulated entity may nevertheless be
compelled to continue service in a particular area
of its business even though operation of this activity involves a loss.' 09 As noted by the Court, "the
Constitution does not confer upon the company
the right to continue to enjoy the [regulatory]
franchise or indeterminate permit and escape
from the burdens incident to its use."110
The ILECs can demonstrate no financial burden, as a preliminary matter, because all compensatory mechanisms of the Act are not yet implemented'
and because no substantial level of
competition requiring sales of unbundled net-

106

251 U.S. 396 (1920).

GTE Takings Report, supranote 75, at 12 (citing BrooksScanlon, 251 U.S. at 399) ("A carrier cannot be compelled to
carry on even a branch of business at a loss, much less the
whole business of carriage.").
108 Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267
U.S. 330, 333 (1925) (construing Brooks-Scanlon as holding
only that a utility cannot "be compelled to continue to operate its [entire] system at a loss").
107

109

Id.

Id. This issue is central to any taking analysis, particularly given the Act's provisions regarding the entrance of incumbent carriers into the long distance market and other areas which are benefits to the public interest. See 47 U.S.C.A.
§§ 271, 272 (West Supp. 1996); see also House Conf Report,
supra note 2, at 113.
M11FCC proceedings that will also determine the level of
additional compensation to ILECs are still pending final
rules as of the completion of this article. They include the
implementation of Section 254 of the Telecommunications
110
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work elements at TELRIC-based prices yet exists
in the local exchange market. 112 In addition,
under Hope Natural Gas, no economic impact can
arise simply from the use of the TELRIC Plus
methodology. Only the end result, the impact of
the use of TELRIC Plus, in connection with the
other economic impacts of the act, may create a
basis for a takings claim. 113 In any event, absent
implementation of the entire new statutory
scheme, any takings claim is premature.
Even if the ILECs' takings claim were not premature, Supreme Court precedent suggests that,
under the regulatory takings analysis, a severe financial burden would only exist if the agency's
chosen rate-making methodology produced rates
so low as to leave insufficient operating capital or
impede the ILECs ability to raise future capital.11 4
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC,115 the D.C. Cir-

cuit examined an ILEC's assertion that the FCC
rate formula was confiscatory because it excluded
part of the carrier's original investment from the
rate base.116 The court rejected this contention,
noting that "[t]here simply has been no demonstration that the FCC's rate base policy threatens
the financial integrity of [the incumbent carriers]
or otherwise impedes their ability to attract capital."' 1 7 Accordingly, the court held that the FCC
was under no obligation to base rates on all historical costs for investments prudent when made.118
Act, Universal Service, CC Dkt. No. 96-45; and Interstate Access Charge Reform, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, and
96-263.
112 Although a number of states have adopted TELRIC
Plus, or a similar methodology, FCC Order, supra note 13,
para. 681, actual use in the marketplace has been slow because of challenges to its constitutionality, even on the state
level. See GTE Takings Report, supra note 75.
113
See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,

320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ("[i]t is not theory but the impact
of the rate order which counts;" rather, it is only necessary
that the "total effect" be just and reasonable).
114 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 312
(1989). The Supreme Court reviewed a state-imposed rate
order and found that it was not constitutionally objectionable. The Court found that "[n]o argument has been made
that these slightly reduced rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by leaving them insufficient
operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise future
capital." Id. The Court further found that there had been
no demonstration "that these rates are inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the risk associated with
their investments under a modified prudent investment
scheme." Id. at 312.
115
988 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
116 Id. at 1258.
117
Id.; see also Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 312 (exclusion of
certain prudent investment costs does not render rate order
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Similarly, the TELRIC Plus methodology will
not deny the ability to attract capital. Despite the
fact that the ILECs have, in recent years, written
off billions of dollars of embedded investment to
conform depreciations lives with those in the
competitive market,119 these write-offs have not
resulted in greatly reduced stock prices or otherwise impeded ILECs' abilities to raise capital. 120
In fact, while write-offs have decreased dividends
for the years in which they are taken, Wall Street
has generally applauded these efforts as preparation for inevitable competition. Where, as here,
the ILECs have had every opportunity to submit
evidence of any sharp decline in share prices,
their silence in this regard speaks loudly.12 '
Moreover, because the TELRIC Plus methodology
by definition includes the costs of attracting capital, use of this methodology, going forward, insures that no economic hardship of constitutional
proportions will arise.
C. TELRIC Plus Pricing Does Not Frustrate
Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The second factor is the extent to which the
..regulation ... interfere [s] with [the] distinct investment-backed expectations" of the individuals
upon which the statutory burden is placed. 22
Any such reasonable expectation must be based
constitutionally infirm).
Illinois Bell, 988 F.2d at 1263.
119 See, e.g., BellSouth 1996 Notice, supra note 24, at A-20,A26-27; GTE 1995 Annual Report, supra note 24, at 32-33.
120 In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Memorandum
118

Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2906, para. 40 (1992) (rejecting claim that rule was confiscatory on grounds that ILEC
"made no showing that supports a finding that it is unable to
attract capital.")
121
To the contrary, since passage of the Act, Wall Street
reports that the ILECs have experienced robust revenue and
earnings-per-share growth. See, e.g., MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH, INC., UNITED STATES TELECOM SERVICES

RBOCs & GTE 2 (Feb. 19, 1997). As of the fourth quarter of
1996, RBOC/GTE share prices were, in fact, outperforming
the market. Id. at 4. Moreover, investment risk ratings have
remained constant, and Merrill Lynch, at least, rates investment in the ILECs as "Accumulate or higher." Id. at 3. Significantly, Wall Street perceived passage of the Act as "a very proRBOC rewrite of telecommunications regulation." MERRILL
LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., UNITED STATES
TELECOM SERVICES - RBOCs & GTE 2 (Feb. 23, 1996). As a
result, Wall Street predicts an improved outlook for the
ILECs and "the oppositefor the largerlong distance companies." Id.

at cover page (emphasis added).
122 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 n.8 (1992); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
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on other than a "'unilateral expectation or an abstract need,'" 1 2 3 and it is not enough that a new
duty imposed on a regulated entity "upsets otherwise settled expectations." 124 As the Court noted
in Connolly, "[t]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme
is buttressed by subsequent amendments to
achieve the legislative end"125 - an expectation is
reasonable only if based on an "explicit governmental guarantee." 26
The mere existence of benefits and obligations
established under a particular regulatory scheme
creates no reasonable expectation that the government will not alter these benefits and obligations to the detriment of individual property values. This is particularly true in industries that
"long ha[ve] been the focus of great public concern and significant government regulation."1 27
Moreover, when the statutory scheme regulates
interdependent entities such as the ILECs and
long distance providers, any single entity may, in
fact, expect regulatory changes for the good of
the whole which may adversely affect an individual entity.' 2 8
The ILECs argue that state commissions,
through a regulatory compact, have promised
them recovery of all embedded costs plus
profit, 129 and according to the ILECs, this regulatory compact gives rise to reasonable investmentbacked expectations. 3 0 As noted above, however,
under established Supreme Court precedent, no
reasonable investment-backed expectation may
exist absent an express guarantee giving rise to
distinct expectations. State commissions emphatically have denied the existence of any guarantee
that the ILECs will recover all costs plus profit on
their investment.' 3 As noted by the Florida Pub-

lic Service Commission with regard to takings
claims raised by GTE of Florida,

City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
123 Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (citation omitted).
124 Connolly v. Pension Guaranty Benefit Trust Corp.,
475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986).
125 Id. at 227 (citing Federal Housing Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)).
126 Ruckeishaus, 467 U.S. at 1011.
127 Id. at 1008.
128 See Colorado Springs Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Farm
Credit Admin., 758 F. Supp. 6, 15 (D.D.C. 1991); see also
Amarillo Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 887 F.2d
507, 512 (5th Cir. 1989).
129
See, e.g., Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No.
PSC-96-0811-FOF-TP, Dkt. No. 950984-TP, at 21 (June 24,
1996).

Id.
1ss See Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S.
548, 550 (1945); Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942)
134 Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d
1168, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
1s5 See, e.g., BellSouth 1996 Notice, supra note 24, at A-14.
136
See, e.g., In re Application of GTE South for Price Regulation (Raleigh, NC), Before the North Carolina Util.
Comm'n., Dkt. No. P-19, DUB 2377 (1995) at 12 ("[P]rice
regulation provides increased incentives for the Company to
invest in new and innovative products and services in North
Carolina, while the risks of these new investments are borne
by the stockholder rather than the customer.").
'37
BellSouth 1996 Notice, supra note 24, at A-12.
138 Id. (emphasis added).

130

Id.

131

Id. at 21-22.

[i]mplicit in GTEFL's arguments is the notion that this
Commission owes GTEFL an increase in local rates to
replace the company's potential losses of expected contribution and profit .... GTEFL does not have a per se
statutory right that it must recover profit and contribution as a result of unbundling and reselling services.
Even under the rate-base regulation regime . . . GTEFL

was merely afforded the opportunity to earn a fair return on its investment, not a guarantee of return. Further, under the new, price-regulated regime .

.

. that

GTEFL has elected, GTEFL is not guaranteed a specific
32
return in this competitive environment.'

Indeed, a rate formula need not guarantee a
profit.'3 3 As the D.C. Circuit has noted, "[a] regulated utility has no constitutional right to a profit,
and a company that is unable to survive without
charging exploitative rates has no entitlement to
such rates."13 4
Moreover, under rate-of-return regulation,
ILECs were merely afforded the opportunity to
earn a fair return. In recent years, many ILECs
have shifted to price cap regulation, eschewing
the security of the rate of return regulation for
the promise of the marketplace. 35 Under price
caps, the ILECs have sought the freedom to earn
increased profits. In exchange, they have proposed to accept greater economic risk.136 Bell-

South, for example, has stated that price cap regulation is the cornerstone of its corporate
strategy.' 37 BellSouth further states that "[d]ue in
part to this strategy, . . . a significant portion of

BellSouth Telecommunications' revenue will no
longer be regulated based on the recovery of specific
costs."' 38 The ILECs' election of price cap regulation, too, suggests that the ILECs can have no reasonable investment-backed interest in the regulatory status quo.
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Finally, investors have been on notice, at least
since divestiture, of the possibility that regulators
would seek competition, at least where the "natural monopoly" has given way to the economic or
technological possibility of competition.139 According to some commentators, the move toward
competition in telecommunications industry has
been evident since the 1950s. 140 In 1971, the FCC
determined that new carriers could enter the interexchange market, signifying clear governmental intent to permit competition in telecommunications. 141 No later than 1994, Competitive
Access Providers ("CAPs") and other competitors
such as cellular, new wireless technologies (such
as Personal Communications Services), and cable
provided the unmistakable capability to compete
for areas of the ILECs' market in the local exchanges.1 4 2 In 1994, FCC Chairman Hundt affirmed the Commission's commitment to "introducing competition into the local exchange
market."1 4 3
Thus, as BellSouth recognized in price cap regulation proceedings begun over a year and a half
ago:
[imn a monopoly environment, the regulator established a rate of return and a revenue requirement
which provided the opportunity for the utility to recover its investment over the life of such investment.
Today, with the changes in technology and accelerating
competition, the regulator can no longer reasonably predict
or provide this opportunity.144

As a result of the pervasive and long-standing
governmental interest in the possibility of effective competition in telecommunications markets
and specifically in the local exchange market
since divestiture of AT&T, no reasonable ILEC investor could have expected that the local exchange market would remain a monopoly forever.
Moreover, investors are on present notice of the
advent of competition and use of TELRIC Plus to
price unbundled network elements in the local
exchange market. As previously indicated, ILEC
investors have not experienced significant economic impacts of the Act to date. Accordingly,
139
See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F.Supp. 131, 160,
165 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
140
Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by
Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983).
141
See Cullari, supra note 58, at 175.
142 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Telephone, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (addressing propriety of FCC rule intended to
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any future losses they may experience will be due
only to unreasonable investor-backed expectations and implicate no constitutional concerns.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 seeks to
encourage competition in all facets of the telecommunications industry. The changes brought
about by this statute significantly adjust the burdens and benefits which the regulatory framework
accords industry participants, permitting long distance carriers and other would-be entrants into local markets and allowing ILECs reciprocal entry
into the long distance market.
Interpreting the Act, many state commissions
have priced unbundled network elements using
forward-looking pricing methodologies including
TELRIC Plus (which the FCC determined simulates prices that would be paid in a competitive
market). ILEC claims that cost-based TELRIC
Plus rates effect a taking without just compensation are without merit. First, these arguments are
premature because they precede implementation
of the full statutory scheme the Act establishes.
Second, the statutory scheme justly compensates
incumbent carriers for the use of their unbundled
network elements both through cost-based
TELRIC Plus rates, alone, and through the other
rights and privileges afforded ILECs under the
Act. Finally, consideration of: (1) economic impacts due to the Act; and (2) the basis for investment-backed expectations of continued monopoly rents suggests that the statutory scheme has
resulted in no significant, negative economic
harm to ILECs and that investors no longer may
claim reasonable investment-backed expectations
in the status quo. Accordingly, neither the Act nor
the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology constitutes
a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.

promote competition local telecommunications markets); see
also Cullari, supra note 58, at 176.
143 Chairman Reed Hundt, Toward Regulation that Fosters
Competition, 39 FED. COM. L. J. 265, 266 (1994).
144 In re Application of BellSouth Telecommunications.
Inc. for, and Election of, Price Regulation, Before the North

Carolina Util. Comm'n, Dkt. No. P-55, SUB 1013 (1996), at
25 (emphasis added).

